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Introduction
Gordon Smith's work, like all the best comparative politics scholarship, has held the line between the two extremes of hyper-empiricism, on the one hand, and over-abstraction on the other. Back in the late 1970s, Smith the political scientist warned his colleagues that 'the pendulum (had) swung too far away' from abstract classification and 'simple typologies'.
Such abstractions remained important, not least because 'they ... have the merit of bringing a wide range of experience under a relatively few headings, and give ... a useful summary from which we can proceed to a detailed differentiation' of political phenomena 1 . Nevertheless, Smith the aesthete rejects the over-use of political science jargon and, when reviewing a book by Ian Budge and Hans Keman some years later, congratulated the authors on avoiding the kind of 'excessively turgid writing that gives comparative politics a bad name in some quarters' 2 .
Budge and Keman's book deals in coalition theory, a sub-field that, at its best, yields up some of the most elegant formal modelling to be found in the discipline but is also prone to the kind of impenetrable techno-babble Smith detests. Broadly speaking, work on coalition theory can be divided into two camps. On the one hand, there is the 'European politics' literature 3 , derived inductively from empirical study of European party systems. On the other, the more rigorous 'game theoretical' approach 4 is grounded in the deductive method and trieswith varying degrees of success -to construct parsimonious models of coalition behaviour that are applicable across time and space. These two approaches are like chalk and cheese, to the extent that Laver and Schofield regard them as 'so far apart that they have almost nothing to contribute to one another' 5 , despite the efforts of Budge and Keman -and Laver and
Schofield themselves -to bridge the divide between them.
I would argue, however, that the gulf between the two approaches is not unbridgeable.
Formal theory does not always provide a good 'fit' with the context of European party systems, particularly the role of ideology and other institutional norms but, as Smith insisted over twenty years ago, comparison between systems is impossible without some degree of abstraction. Students of comparative politics will know that Smith's own work -on Germany and Western Europe more generally -has always been theoretically informed.
The rest of this article explores some of the common themes addressed in both Smith's work on coalitions and in some of the more formal-deductive coalition literature. The article takes a thematic approach, starting with Smith's concept of the 'politics of centrality', the centripetal dynamic that he regards as part of the 'efficient secret' of German democracy 6 . It then discusses examines party systems -the political market-places in which coalition bargains are struck -and the role of the parties within them. These issues are examined through the lens of formal 'economic' models of coalition formation, particularly the 'minimum winning coalition' model. The article demonstrates that such models fail to adequately predict or explain coalition politics in the Federal Republic, because they ignore the issues of (partisan) ideology and other institutional norms. These are the rules of the game, and are often where economic models come unstuck: as such rules provide the 'friction'
or 'stickiness' that prevents us drawing a direct analogy between party systems and the relatively frictionless markets assumed by neo-classical economics (from which such models are derived). The article goes on to examine the issues of ideology and norms in more detail, whilst introducing a more sophisticated strand of 'policy-oriented' coalition theory: the 'minimum connected winning' and 'median legislator' models. In each segment, the core assumptions of some of the formal models are sketched out and weighed against the empirical work of Smith and associated scholars, with an emphasis on Smith's work on coalition behaviour in the Federal Republic's party system. The article demonstrates that, although they are methodologically distinct from one another, there is much common ground to be found between deductive policy-oriented models and Smith's more inductive approach (in particular, between the median legislator model and Smith's idea of the politics of centrality). Finally, the article concludes with an assessment of whether the idea of the politics of centrality still holds true today.
The Politics of Centrality
Much of Smith's work is concerned with the idea of an 'efficient secret' -a benign configuration of institutional structures and norms, as well as partisan ideology -at the heart of the German polity. It is this secret, which Smith calls 'the politics of centrality', that underpins the remarkable stability of the Federal Republic's political settlement 7 .
In terms of institutional structures and norms, one can identify four key elements that re-enforce the politics of centrality. First, Germany's system of proportional representation (augmented by a five percent hurdle to representation), which promotes a pattern of coalition government, limits the number of viable parties within the party system, and serves to shut out parties of the extreme right and left 8 . Second, the idea of the Partienstaat, which raised the public esteem of political parties in the early post-war years, gave them a direct stake in the maintainance of the State and the enhancement of its legitimacy, and thus discouraged the emergence of the 'anti-system' sentiment within the parties that helped undermine the Weimar Republic. Third, 'Chancellor democracy' and the principle of Richtlinienkompetenz, which established the office of Federal Chancellor as primus inter pares, avoiding the constitutional tussles between Chancellor and President that characterised the Weimar years. Fourth, the rule that requires the Bundestag to give a 'constructive vote of no confidence' before voting out an incumbent Chancellor. These four elements serve to narrow the ideological range of 'relevant' parties (parties that are considered to be koalitionsfähig), enhance the status of the Federal Chancellor as leader of the governing coalition, and increase the opportunity costs of either exit from an existing coalition or the formation of rival coalitions. Taken together, they foster the qualities of ideological moderation, coalition discipline, and governmental stability 9 .
In the first few decades of the Federal Republic, these qualities came to permeate the ideologies of the traditional mainstream parties, the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD, all of whom 'share a strong governing orientation' 10 . In addition, the SPD's adoption of the Bad Godesberg 
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Many formal coalition models build out from Anthony Downs ' 13 analogy of party systems as markets, with parties as firms competing with each other for voters who, in turn are analogous with consumers. In the Downsian universe, the policy dimension is laid out onedimensionally along a single left/right continuum (although later models have often supplemented this with an additional dimension, often based on a authoritarian/libertarian or materialist/post-materialist dimension). Under normal circumstances, it is assumed that the individual voter will have one ideal position along the continuum and that voters' preferences are fairly evenly distributed along it. Theoretically, the distribution of these preferences in normal party systems resembles a classic bell-curve, with the aggregate reaching an equilibrium (and thus effectively a consensus) around the median of the distribution. It is around this point, occupied by the 'median voter' 14 , that the office-seeking parties will manoeuvre in order to maximise votes. By contrast, where an individual voter's preferences on different policy issues are more inconsistent, the bell-curve does not achieve this centrist equilibrium: fragmenting the party system and allowing space within it for extremist parties.
In the last years of the Weimar Republic, for instance, this fragmentation was so profound that the centre collapsed and anti-system parties effectively constituted a 'wrecking majority' within the party system 15 .
Like markets, party systems display various degrees of differentiation: defined in such terms as the degree of concentration or deconcentration, partisan alignment or dealignment, dominant or cross-cutting cleavages. Moreover, the opportunity costs of entry into the party system differ across time and space, not only because the appeal of a given political 'product'
differs, but also due to system attributes such as voting rules (plurality versus proportional systems), barriers to representation (such as the five percent hurdle at the Federal level in Germany), laws regulating internal party democracy, and so on. Thus it is important to note that party systems are constrained arenas, in which the composition, stability and durability of coalitions are partly determined by system attributes.
Smith's work on party systems does not use this market analogy, but he nevertheless recognised the importance of system attributes in determining the number of parties within the system, as well as the stability and effectiveness of governmental coalitions. Using a typology based on the ideas of 'governing' and 'social' cohesion, Smith posits four simple classifications to encompass this potential for differentiation across party systems. These are set out in Table One , below. As Smith observes, there is no need for there to be a direct link between levels of governmental and social cohesion. It is possible for a party system dominated by a single party, or small number of parties, to display high levels of governmental cohesion (in terms of stable, durable coalitions) whilst failing to enhance social integration. Conversely, a diffused party system may create high levels of social cohesion -in the sense that all shades of political opinion have an effective 'voice' within the system -but not deliver the goods in terms of stable government. 

Smith considers majoritarian systems -displaying high levels of cohesion on both dimensions -to be the ideal type, as they deliver stable government and an integrated electorate.
Majoritarian systems are often associated with two-party systems, but can work under certain circumstances in multi-party systems. Thus the Federal Republic's party system, dominated by two 'balanced clusters' 17 of parties, fulfils the criteria of a majoritarian system. At the time of writing, Smith was referring to the cluster of the SPD and FDP in coalition, with the CDU/CSU in opposition. Obviously, the decline of the total Volkspartei vote since then, and the subsequent emergence of the Greens and PDS has changed this dynamic somewhat (this is discussed later in the article). Nevertheless, Smith's assertion can be supported by the kind of market analogy posited by Downs and others. High levels of governmental cohesion increase the opportunity costs of entry into, and exit from, a given coalition, whilst high levels of social cohesion raises the opportunity costs for new entrants into the political market-place 18 .
Combined together, majoritarian systems can create a virtuous circle of coalition stability and duration. The corollary to this is that under such systems the number of potential coalitions that can form is limited. Continuing the market analogy, if majoritarian party systems are markets they are not open ones.
Political parties as firms
Neo-classical economic theory often assumes the existence of perfect competition within markets, but in practice this is often not the case. Markets are often oligopolistic, in other words dominated by a small number of large firms. In some cases, they are characterised by the presence of cartels, groups of firms that co-operate together in order to 'rig' the market and shut out potential competitors. In relatively open economies, oligopolistic markets are tolerated, but cartels are looked upon as undesirable and regulators often act to break them up.
Nevertheless, cartel-like activity continues to take place in many markets.
The analogy of the oligopolistic market is easily applied to the German party systemespecially at the Federal level. 
Consequences for numerical coalition formation critieria
Despite this shift to the political left over the last twenty years, it was not until 1998 that the right-of-centre Kohl government was unseated by the SPD and Greens. One can think of two obvious reasons why this might be the case: first, that the numerical composition of the Federal Republic's party system did not change sufficiently to oust the Kohl government and, second, that there were ideological constraints that prevented the formation of an alternative coalition.
Let us leave aside the issue of ideology (which is discussed later in this article) for the moment, and concentrate on the number of parties within the party system. Theorists such as Riker 19 and Gamson 20 concentrate on coalition size as being the key structural attribute that determines coalition formation. All parties are assumed to be office seeking and will attempt to gain admission to any coalition that may form. Riker predicts that parties will try to create coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning, in order to maximise the payoffs to each coalition member. In its pure theoretical form, this will result in a 'minimum winning' coalition of 50 percent plus one vote. However, in practice, Riker accepts that slightly larger 'minimal winning' coalitions are more likely to form. Gamson gives the coalition formation 'game' a different emphasis and argues that parties will try and form a 'cheapest winning' coalition. The key difference is that Gamson assumes that parties would rather be a relatively large member of a small coalition than a junior partner in a bigger coalition, even when the tangible benefits of doing so are broadly comparable. If numerical criteria are decisive in determining the number and composition of possible coalitions within a given party system, one of the logical consequences of a party oligopoly is that this number will be limited. Likewise, as an oligopoly breaks down, the possibilities should increase.
Indeed, in game theoretical terms, the expansion of the party system from three to five parties should increase this number exponentially 21 . However, if one looks at the actual size and composition of coalitions formed over this period at the Federal level, this is not the case.
These are set out in Table Three , below.
If one regards the CDU/CSU's combined Bundestag faction as effectively a single party, Table Three 
From party oligopoly to party cartel?
System attributes, such as the five percent hurdle to representation and the tendency for If one discounts these two periods, Federal-level coalitions have avoided excessive surplus majorities. Therefore, to some extent, Riker and Gamson's assertions appear to be supported by the evidence. However, whilst avoiding unnecessarily large majorities, not all of the remaining coalitions formed over this period conform to the 'minimal winning' formula. This is particularly the case since the first juncture in 1983, when the Greens entered the Bundestag, thus increasing the number of potential coalition variants. The disparity between theoretical and actual winning coalitions is set out in Table Four , below. 'Cartel parties' are characterised by elite dominance, a centralised structure and a high degree of alienation between office holding politicians and their activists. Activists retain a high symbolic value as the legitimator of elites, but they are increasingly by-passed by themespecially when elites intend to co-operate with elites from other parties. The cartel party model does not map exactly onto German parties, not least because the German federal structure is replicated within the parties themselves, thus weakening central control.
Nevertheless, in terms of elite dominance and conditions of alienation between party elites and the membership, all of the major parties -including the Greens -conform to some degree to the cartel party model 27 .
However, there are two problems with the cartel-party as an explanation for the persistence of surplus majority coalitions since 1983. First, the marginalisation of the ordinary membership has made it easier for party elites to pursue strategies of political cooperation with each other, including forming coalitions 28 . The logic of the cartel party model is that party elites are able to forge coalition agreements in the face of opposition from the membership: in other words, party elites enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Therefore, the cartel party model per se does not necessarily predict a closing of coalition options, given that elite autonomy might increase the number of possible coalitions that could form (as the membership has little or no veto power over potential coalitions). The second problem is that the cartel party model does not provide an explanation for why parties would act in ways that are, on the face of it, against their interests -either by joining surplus majority coalitions when they could be members of alternatives with a smaller majority (like the FDP in 1983 and the Greens in 1998), or by inviting 'junior' parties to join a coalition when other small parties would provide a smaller majority (as the CDU/CSU did in 1987, and the SPD did in 1998).
Clearly, there are other system attributes at work -relating to partisan ideology and other institutional norms.
Ideology and Institutional Norms
Policy-oriented coalition models Table Four demonstrates what coalition theorists have known since the 1960s -that models based on numerical formation criteria alone are not only poor predictors of coalition outcomes, they also have very little explanatory value. Because of this, theorists began to factor in some kind of 'policy dimension'. Early policy-oriented work, such as that by Axelrod 29 , builds upon office-seeking models and introduces the policy dimension as a secondary formation criterion. His model assumes that office-seeking remains the central strategic goal of all players, but members of the successful coalition will ideally be adjacent to one another along a single Downsian Left-Right ideological continuum -in other words they will be 'ideologically adjacent'. Such ideological adjacency will serve to minimise conflicts of interest. Therefore, Axelrod's model predicts that the 'minimal connected winning' coalition will be the most likely outcome 30 .
Although Axelrod's model assumes ideological adjacency, it has no conception of the ideological distance between parties and cannot pick up the nuances of ideological conflict. However, as already noted, the net effect of the two historical junctures of 1983 and 1990 was both to break up this cosy party oligopoly, and to move the centre of gravity within the party system to the political left. Nevertheless, it would take another fifteen years for these systemic changes to manifest themselves in coalition terms at the Federal level.
One reason for this was party ideology. As Smith notes, for historical reasons, all three mainstream parties adhere to the principle of 'militant democracy', one of the manifestations of which is an intolerance of parties considered to be insufficiently staatserhaltend 34 . This shunning of 'outsider' parties was particularly acute at the Federal level and served to isolate the Greens throughout the 1980s and, subsequently, the PDS after 1990. Thus the real coalition 'win set', made up of parties with sufficient democratic credentials, remained limited long after the original triangular party system began to break down. As has been discussed elsewhere, the shutting out of the Greens and PDS benefited the CDU/CSU, as it denied the SPD potential coalition options on the political left 35 . The fact that the SPD acquiesced in this is evidence of the degree to which it has become intimately associated with the dominant ideology of the Federal Republic over the last fifty years.
The other reason, however, was purely mathematical. Up until the 1998 Bundestag elections, the balance of party weights within the legislature was such that the FDP retained its Mparty status and remained in government. This is in keeping with the pattern identified by Klingemann and Volkens, noted earlier. The period from 1983 to 1998 was characterised by both an uninterrupted sequence of CDU/CSU-FDP coalitions and also a phase of electoral decline for the SPD. As a result, it was not until the 1998 elections that the SPD could muster enough seats in the Bundestag to unseat the incumbent coalition. However, as Table Five (below) indicates, the 1998 elections brought about three other changes. First, the status of Mparty moved from the FDP to the SPD -signalling that the shift to the political left within the party system had finally manifested itself in terms of seats in the Bundestag. Second, unlike the FDP, the SPD was not only the Mparty, it was also Mparty(k) -making its inclusion in any ideologically connected minimal winning coalition inevitable. Third, the new Red-Green coalition signalled a subtle change in the dynamics of coalition formation in the Federal Republic. On the one hand, the presence of the SPD in the new coalition was in keeping with the established pattern of the party 'owning' the median legislator in the their junior partner, the SPD has totally dissolved the old coalition rather than including one of the incumbent 
Conclusion: Beyond the Politics of Centrality?
It remains to be seen how significant the changes of September 1998 will turn out to be. One explanation is that 1998 was a one-off election, where the changes noted earlier were forced upon the parties involved, with the proviso that future elections will see a return to the status quo ante. There is evidence to support this. The Red-Green coalition was not the smallest connected winning option that could have formed -an SPD-FDP coalition would have been three seats smaller (although the difference would not have been large enough to have a significant impact on payoffs). Moreover, many in the SPD -including Gerhard Schröder -had expressed misgivings about the suitability of the Greens as a coalition partner at the Federal level (although SPD activists were more enthusiastic) 37 . It remains unclear why the FDP ruled out the option of a coalition with the SPD. Ideological differences might have come into play, and there is evidence of a degree of animosity between Schröder and some FDP politicians going back to his days as Minister President of Lower Saxony 38 . Moreover, it has been clear for many years that the FDP tends to suffer at the polls when it defects from an established coalition 39 . One could argue that a combination of all of these factors might have made an SPD-FDP coalition impossible at the time. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to rule it out in the future.
The other explanation is more profound. For some time, there has been speculation that the extraordinary dominance of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl over the period 1983-1998 masked a fundamental change in the dynamics of the party system at the Federal level 40 .
Thus, whilst the emergence of the Greens and PDS led to the creation of significant new coalition arrangements at the Länder level 41 , the balance of power at the Federal level If these two scenarios were to come to pass, the Federal Republic's party system would have moved beyond the 'politics of centrality'. But one Bundestag election is not enough evidence on which to base such a conclusion and, as already noted, the next Bundestag elections may see a return to a more familiar coalition arrangement at the Federal level. Yet even if this is not the case, a return to power of the current Red-Green coalition would in itself fit the pattern of stable coalition arrangements that has become the norm since the foundation of the Federal Republic. As such, it would not signal the end of the politics of centrality. On
